Introduction
There is a broad consensus that the soft US dollar pegs operated by a number of Asian countries prior to 1997 contributed to the regional financial crisis of 1997-98.
There is, however, much less agreement on the types of exchange rate regimes operated by many Asian countries since the crisis. To be sure, among the crisis-hit countries, the Malaysian ringgit has been unambiguously fixed to the US dollar (at 3.80 Malaysian
Ringgit per US dollar) since September 1998. In contrast, the four other crisis-hit countries, viz. Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand, officially proclaimed to have floated their exchange rates while adopting a monetary policy strategy based on inflation targeting (see Table 1 and ).
There is a burgeoning literature documenting that there can be a significant to the ongoing debate on the need for global macroeconomic adjustments and the manner in which such adjustments are to be attained (Rajan, 2004 (Rajan, , 2005 . pressure (EMP) indices to provide a summary measure of the degree of flexibility (or inversely, the degree of intervention). Section 4 presents more formal tests on the extent to which each of the currencies examined have been pegged to the US dollar and to the Japanese yen using variations of the methodology pioneered by Frankel and Wei (1994) . Section 5 offers a summary and some concluding remarks.
Pre and Post Crisis Behaviour of Exchange Rates, Interest Rates and Reserves
We attempt to do two things in this section. One, we investigate the behaviour of exchange rates, interest rates and reserves for the crisis-affected countries using monthly data for the period 1990 to 2004. The nexus between the volatilities of exchange rates, interest rates and reserves is important from a policy perspective in that it offers insight into whether central banks used interest rates or reserves to manage currency movements. Two, in order to assist with the comparison, we split the sample into the pre crisis and post crisis sub-samples. The volatilities of exchange rates, interest rates and reserves for the pre and post crisis samples are compared for each country and between the crisis-hit countries and the known 'floaters' of Australia, New
Zealand, Canada, UK and USA (as defined by Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) .
Standard Deviations of Exchange Rates, Interest Rates and Reserves
Figures 2a to 2c present annual (calendar year) standard deviations of monthly percentage changes in exchange rates for the crisis-affected countries 3 .
per yen are calculated from the US/yen rate, and real effective exchange rate (REERs) are from the ADB-ARIC database. Reserves data are taken from lines 11, 14 and 16c of IFS, and interest rates are taken from line 60B of IFS.
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The extreme volatility of the exchange rates during the crisis of 1997-98 notwithstanding, the exchange rate volatilities in Korea, Thailand and Indonesia are significantly higher in the post crisis period, while there is no volatility of the ringgit against the US dollar, as would be expected (Figure 1 ). The differences in variability for the Philippines seem economically insignificant when eyeballing the data. Exchange rate volatility of the regional currencies against the yen does not appear to have increased discernibly pre and post crisis, except possibly for Indonesia (Figure 2b ). The results for the real effective exchange rates (REERs) show similar but not as marked differences between the two periods compared to the volatilities of local currencies per US dollars (Figure 2c ). Overall, the exchange rate volatilities offer some indicative initial evidence to support the claim that exchange rate regimes in Korea, the Philippines and Thailand have become more flexible post crisis.
It well known that unconditional exchange rate volatility alone cannot adequately describe the currency regime adopted by a country. This is because central banks could use interest rates and reserves as policy instruments to help actively manage or influence currency movements. Accordingly, in order to present a more complete account of the possible change of regime (i.e. degree of conditional exchange rate flexibility), the volatilities of interest rates and reserves must also be taken into account. Specifically, a regime considered to be less flexible will have relatively low exchange rate volatility, ceteris paribus 4 . If, in the event of relatively low exchange rate 9 volatility and where reserve volatility is high but interest rate volatility is low, then it might be posited that reserves are the primary policy instrument (i.e. exchange rate intervention). If reserve volatility is low but interest rate volatility is high, then plausibly, interest rates might be the primary instrument for stabilizing the currency (Reinhart, 2000) 5 .
Figure 3 examines the money market interest rates in annual standard deviation of monthly first differences. As is apparent, interest rates are clearly less volatile after the crisis, particularly for Korea, Thailand and the Philippines 6 . proportion of the money base that is being used for intervention. The differences in reserve volatility between the pre and post crisis periods are not easily detectable for 5 We are abstracting here from issues relating to sterilization of reserve intervention. 6 Money market rates (IFS line 60B) are used as they appear to adequately represent the policy rate and offer sufficient volatility for the purposes of analysis. most countries. Korea is a notable exception where it seems that reserves volatility has increased significantly post crisis (also see Willett, 2004 
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Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) Indices
Defining the Indices
As discussed, it is important to simultaneously consider the three variables (viz.
exchange rates, interest rates and reserve changes) to obtain a proper perspective on the extent of exchange rate flexibility (or conversely, the extent of intervention). One way of incorporating all these variables would be to compute an exchange rate pressure 
(1)
where σ ER is the annual standard deviation of monthly (log) percentage difference in the exchange rate, σ IR is the annual standard deviation of monthly first differences in money market rates, and σ NFA is the annual standard deviation of monthly percentage difference in reserves (Net Foreign Assets/Lagged Money Base). All standard deviations are calculated as in the previous sections.
While there are a number of different types of EMP indices (for instance, see Guimãeres and Karacadag, 2004) , the particular set of indices were chosen because they are easily aligned with the discussion of the previous section about the role of interest rates and/or reserves as policy instruments. For instance, a low index value in this instance may imply less exchange rate flexibility or a higher level of intervention. Other things being equal, higher reserve volatility will reduce the index value, possibly suggesting that reserves are being employed as a monetary policy tool in order to limit exchange rate flexibility.
Index 1 measures the possible effects of reserve intervention but ignores the effects of interest rates. Baig (2001) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) 
Interpreting the Results
As in the previous section, three measures of the exchange rate are used, viz. completely inflexible vis-à-vis the US dollar. Somewhat surprisingly, after a period of 12 Cleansing the data to focus only on reserves change due to policy intervention rather than valuation changes is not possible as most countries do not provide data on the currency composition of reserves. 13 The calculation of weights in indices of this type is a critical feature of the literature on EMP. In some cases theory is used as the basis for determining the weights (for instance, see Girton and Roper, 1977 Based on the foregoing analysis, as would be expected, while the Thai baht has become more flexible in REER terms, the won seems to have become less so. Indeed, comparing Figures 5a, 5b and 5c, it is apparent that while the EMP of the Korean won vis-à-vis the US dollar was lower than the yen or the REER pre crisis, post crisis its EMP vis-à-vis the REER was lower than the other two. This suggests that while the won may have been heavily managed relative to the US dollar prior to the crisis, there is some evidence to suggest it has become more managed relative to a basket (involving the yen and US dollar), such that the won's REER is relatively stable.
How robust are these results? If one examines Figures 6a to 6c (using Index 2), we reach the same conclusion that the regional currencies with the exception of the Malaysian ringgit have become more flexible vis-à-vis the US dollar post crisis. As discussed above, the Korean won appears to be reverting to a soft dollar peg.
Interestingly, however, the further conclusion that the won may be more heavily pegged to the REER than the US dollar post crisis no longer holds. The reason for this is the rise in the Korean won's EMP post crisis relative to the yen compared to the previous conclusion of a decline (compare Figure 5b and 6b) . However, the finding that the Thai baht has become relatively more flexible in general (relative to the US dollar, the yen and in REER terms) continues to hold.
Extent of Influence of the US Dollar and the Yen in Asian Currencies
One of the main results from the previous two sections is that the extent of intervention in the US dollar has decreased for the most part, but there appears to be a reversion to a US dollar peg in some instances, particularly in the case of Korea.
However, there is some degree of uncertainty as to whether the Korean won is following (pegged to?) the yen more closely post crisis. This section presents two sets of formal tests (OLS and Kalman Filter based estimates) to ascertain the degree to which local currencies have been and continue to be influenced by the US dollar and by the yen
Simple OLS Regressions
The first set of tests is based on the well-known work by Frankel and Wei (1994) . The method essentially involves conducting an OLS test of the local currency on other currencies that are considered to influence the former. Each currency is expressed in terms of an 'independent' numeraire. The equation examined is as follows:
where LC refers to the local currency. All currencies are expressed in log differences and the numeraire currency used is the Swiss franc. As with the empirical results in the previous section, the pre crisis sample is 1990:1 to 1997:3 and the post crisis sample is 1999:6 to 2004:6. 15 When interpreting the significance levels of the coefficient estimates it is important to be aware of the possible existence of multicollinearity in models of this type.
The results based on the simple OLS in Table 3 reveal that the value of β 1 has fallen after the crisis. By and large, this validates the results from the previous sections in that the degree of flexibility against the US dollar has increased after the crisis. Not only has the value fallen, but the level of significance has declined as well, possibly an indication of a reduction in the tightness of the peg to the US dollar. Also noteworthy is the increase in the degree of influence of the yen after the crisis. This is noticeable across-the-board. It should be noted though that the significance levels are lower for the yen than for the US dollar. This is broadly consistent with the results in Section 3, whereby the EMPs of the currencies using the US dollar have generally risen post crisis and have fallen relative to the yen, but the former still exceeds the latter.
Kalman Filter Estimations
The relative degree of significance between the US dollar and the yen can be explored further by applying the Kalman Filter to the regressions 16 . Such regressions allow for the coefficient's evolution to be tracked over the entire sample. The model used is as follows:
Equation (3) once again describes the measurement equation of the system, but each coefficient is assumed to vary over time, the evolution of which is given by Equations find that Thai and Korean interest rates have become less sensitive to US interest rates post crisis, suggesting greater flexibility of these currencies relative to the US dollar.
As expected, the β 1 coefficient for Malaysia is 1 after the crisis. Interestingly, the influence of the yen (β 2 ) is more volatile after the crisis for Thailand and higher in value for Korea and Indonesia, but also more volatile, especially for Korea. The results for the Philippines accord to those in the last section. There appears to be little difference in the influence of the US dollar or the yen between the pre and post crisis periods. The yen maintains a small influence over the Philippine peso. Needless to say, the results for Malaysia are as expected, the ringgit being influenced entirely by the US dollar post crisis.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has reviewed the pre and post crisis exchange rate regimes for Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. The de jure regimes for Korea, Thailand and Indonesia seem to suggest that exchange rates underwent a transition from soft US dollar pegs to floating exchange rates (cum inflation targeting) after the crisis.
Malaysia's regime reverted to a fully fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar since September 1998. The Philippines, which was least impacted by the crisis, maintained its status as operating a 'dirty' floating exchange rate regime.
We return to our basic question posed in the Introduction --Have the Asian countries (except Malaysia) moved to more flexible exchange rate regimes, or have they reverted to soft US dollar pegs post crisis? From the various measures of de facto regimes presented in this paper, it appears that there is definitely an increase in exchange rate flexibility after the crisis in the case of Thailand. There is some evidence of a possible reversion to a US dollar peg for Indonesia (also see . The results for Korea are arguably most interesting in that they suggest that while there is still a significant and possibly increasing degree of influence by the US dollar on local currencies after the crisis, the influence of the yen has increased materially post crisis. However, the variability of this influence has also increased. As such, it is unclear whether the Korean monetary authorities are consciously placing more weight to the yen in managing the Korean won as suggested by Taguchi (2004) , or they have genuinely let the currency float and the market has caused a higher comovement between local currencies and the yen. This is an area for future research 18 .
Going forward, in a world of generalized flexible exchange rates among the major currencies, there may be a case for Asian currencies to consider pegging to a basket of currencies Rajan, 2002 and Rajan, 2002) . By managing exchange rate changes against a composite bundle of currencies (that is, stabilizing the 'effective' exchange rate), countries may be able to buffer themselves against outside exchange rate shocks (such as G-3 currency variations) and neutralize this source of instability.
Such a 'band-basket-crawl' or BBC arrangement may not only be an attractive regime for countries that have embraced more flexibility post crisis like Korea and Thailand, but also US dollar 'fixers' in Asia like China, Hong Kong and Malaysia 19 . Indonesia, which appears to have had difficulties with implementing an inflation targeting regime and may be reverting to a soft dollar peg, could also consider such a regime. While such an arrangement is no panacea against unsustainable macroeconomic policies and extreme external shocks, it may be a way of trading off the disciplinary and credibility benefits of a pegged regime with the flexibility of a floating one. 12.00 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 Thailand -2.00
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Figure 3: Standard Deviations of Interest Rates
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